If you sustain a personal injury in a particular state, it is commonly thought and expected that the law of that state (forum) will apply. It is common for a choice of law issue to arise before a trial court where the forum is not the state of where in the personal injury occurred. In Hataway v. McKinley, 830 S.W.2d 53 (Tenn. 1992), Grady Hataway died as a result of injuries he sustained during a scuba dive in a North Little Rock, Arkansas, rock quarry. The dive was supervised by the defendant, Robert W. McKinley, and conducted as part of a scuba class taught at Memphis State University. As a result of Hataway’s death, his parents filed this wrongful death action in the Shelby County Circuit Court. Although both the decedent and the defendant were life-long residents of Tennessee, the trial court (consistent with existing law) held that Arkansas law governed the plaintiffs’ wrongful death action under the lex loci delicti doctrine.
In this case, the Tennessee Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the lex loci delicti conflicts-of-law doctrine should continue to be followed in tort cases in Tennessee. The first issue for the Court to determine was whether a conflict of law between Tennessee and Arkansas. The case was filed under the common law theory of general negligence merely asserting that a party has a duty of care of towards another party and upon the breach of that duty, a party whose has sustained damages may file a cause of action for the same. Given the difference between comparative fault in Arkansas and contributory negligence in Tennessee, as well as the difference between the wrongful death statutes, the Court concluded that there was a conflict between Arkansas and Tennessee law which was a necessary predicate to deciding which state’s law should govern this wrongful death action.
The doctrine of lex loci delicti had been the governing choice of law for over 100 years. Under this doctrine, a Tennessee Court would apply the law of the state where the injury occurred in adjudicating the substantive rights and liability of the parties. However, there was a public policy exception to the doctrine and the law of Tennessee would be applied “where the law of the jurisdiction where the tort occurred is against good morals or natural justice, or for some other reason, its enforcement would be prejudicial to the general interests of our citizens.” Winters v. Maxey, 481 S.W.2d 755, 756 (Tenn. 1972)
The plaintiffs argued that the doctrine of lex loci delicti should be abandoned by this Court because it was obsolete, unjust, and arbitrary. Adherence to the doctrine, the plaintiffs said, often leads to application of the law of a state that has no interest in the controversy or no contact with the parties other than the fortuitous circumstance that the injury occurred in that state. The defendant, on the other hand, maintained that we should retain the doctrine because it promoted certainty, predictability, and uniformity in conflicts cases. The Supreme Court more specifically held that:
We agree with the great majority of other jurisdictions that the [**11] doctrine of lex loci is outmoded because of changes in society, causing a consequential development of modern law. 1 The lex loci doctrine had its conceptual foundation in the common-law vested rights doctrine, which was founded on respect for a state’s territorial sanctity. See Travelers ‘s Indemnity Co. v. Lake, 594 A.2d 38 (Del. 1991), Winters, supra, 481 S.W.2d at 756. We observe that in today’s modern industrial world, the vested rights theory, with its emphasis on territorial boundaries, has little relevance. “State and national boundaries are of less significance today by reason of the increased mobility of our population and of the increasing tendency of men to conduct their affairs across boundary lines.” Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law, ch. 7 at 413 (1971) (Introductory Note). See also Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d at 317 (Tex. 1979)
The Suprume Court adoped the “most significant relationship” approach of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971). In applying the “most significant relationship” approach to Hataway, the Court found that the State of Tennessee had a more significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties, and that Tennessee law should govern the action. More specifically, the Court adopted the “most significant relationship” approach of §§ 6, 145, 146, and 175 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971), which [**21] provides:
§ 145. The General Principle
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state, which with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6. 3
The Restatement sets out the following contacts between the parties and facts surrounding the cause of action for particular analysis:
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties,
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue.
§ 146. Personal Injuries
In an action for personal injury, the local law of the state where the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied.
§ 175. Right of Action for Death
In an action for wrongful death, the local law of the state where the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under [**23] the principles stated in § 6 to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied.
The Supreme Court concluded with the following opinion and holding:
The only contact the parties had with the State of Arkansas was that the injury occurred in that state. Both the decedent and the defendant were life-long residents of Tennessee and neither owned any property in Arkansas. The parties’ relationship was centered in Tennessee because the relationship was formed and continued as a result of the decedent’s participation in the scuba class taught at Memphis State by the defendant. We think the fact that the injury occurred in Arkansas was merely a fortuitous circumstance, and that the State of Arkansas has no interest in applying its laws to this dispute between Tennessee residents. Under the facts here [**24] presented, we conclude that although the injury occurred in Arkansas, the State of Tennessee has a more significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the factors and contacts set out in §§ 6 and 145 of Restatement (Second).
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